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Article
Against Permititis: Why Voluntary
Organizations Should Regulate the Use of
Cancer Drugs
Richard A. Epstein t
INTRODUCTION
One of the thorniest questions in legal analysis concerns
the longstanding tension between individual autonomy and social control. The principle of autonomy, or individual self-rule,
holds a strong grip on everyone's imagination by posing the following question: If I am not allowed to control my own destiny,
just who can? In this context, autonomy functions as the first
and most powerful line of defense against the domination of one
person by another and of all individuals by the state. At the
same time, the faithful adherence to the principle of individual
autonomy could be almost too strong, because it precludes the
ability of the state to organize the provision of public goods.
Writing in 1965, Mancur Olson, Jr. showed how the absence of
state intervention could lead to the underprovision of key public goods such as national defense.' Three years later, Garrett
Hardin showed how the failure to impose social controls could
lead to the tragedy of the commons, whereby excessive hunting
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or fishing would eventually bring about the premature collapse
of wildlife populations. 2
Just as the case for state regulation has become a more
powerful tool for dealing with public goods and common-pool
problems, the principle of autonomy continues to hold sway
with respect to the decisions that individuals make over their
own bodies. This issue is of supreme importance in dealing with
medical matters, where the autonomy principle offers guidance
on the ancient question of whether to accept or reject medical
treatments. That principle received perhaps its most famous
short formulation by Judge Benjamin Cardozo who wrote nearly a century ago:
Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who
performs an operation without his patient's consent commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages.

. .

. This is true, except in

cases of emergency where the patient is unconscious, and where it is
necessary to operate before consent can be obtained.3

Notwithstanding the pervasive concerns of collective action, there is little doubt that half of this thesis still holds true
today. The defensive use of personal autonomy allows individuals to refuse medical treatment that others may have concluded, even rightly, would work for their own benefit. 4 At the
same time, the offensive use of autonomy-namely the right to
accept treatment with consent-has been widely rejected today,
especially in connection with the use of drugs. No individual
today can demand whatever medical treatment he or she wishes to receive. The modern position has been put forcefully by
George Annas: "Patients in the United States have always had
a right to refuse any medical treatment, but we have never had
a right to demand mistreatment, inappropriate treatment, or
even investigational or experimental interventions."5 Evidently,
the road to unrestricted medical usage is blocked by daunting
institutional obstacles, where most notably the Food and Drug
2. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SC. 1243, 1244,
1248 (1968); see also H. Scott Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common
Property Resource: The Fishery, 62 J. POL. EcoN. 124, 125-26 (1954).
3. Schloendorff v. Soc'y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914), abrogated on other grounds by Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3, 9 (N.Y. 1957), superseded by statute, N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-d (McKinney 2007), as recognized in Retkwa v. Orentreich, 584 N.Y.S.2d 710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992).
4. See Richard A. Epstein, The Erosion of Individual Autonomy in Medical Decisionmaking: Of the FDA and IRBs, 96 GEO. L.J. 559, 566-80 (2008).
5. George J. Annas, Cancer and the Constitution-Choiceat Life's End,
357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 408, 410 (2007).
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Administration (FDA) must license a drug before it may be
made available for general sale or use.
The common justifications for imposing this restriction rest
on the assumption that ordinary individuals cannot collect or
correctly interpret the information that is needed to make intelligent decisions on these matters. Therefore, the argument continues, state intervention is necessary to guard against the exploitation of incompetent patients by unscrupulous purveyors
of medical care. Indeed, a close reading of the well-known 1979
Belmont Report shows how easy it is to convert an implicit endorsement of the autonomy principle into a strong call for increased government oversight of medical treatment. 6
This current uneven acceptance of the autonomy principle
manifests itself most clearly in the area of drug regulation. The
FDA can currently keep drugs off the market if it so chooses,
thereby limiting the scope of autonomous choices. Once a drug
makes it to the marketplace, however, the normal principles of
individual autonomy apply. Within this context it is critical to
recall that ordinary individuals do not make their decisions in
an isolated position, akin to Robinson Crusoe stranded on a
desert island.7 Rather, they consciously rely on voluntarily chosen experts to assist and guide them in their choices. In effect,
the desirability of autonomous choices rests on the belief that
competent individuals, supported by advice from families,
friends, and professionals, can, on average, make better decisions about their own health care than any government agency
that seeks to protect them from their own mistakes.
The central challenge in modern drug regulation is to explain why the FDA should be maintained as a public
gatekeeper, instead of being relegated to the more modest role
6. See NAT'L COMM'N FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF
BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF RESEARCH 4-5 (1978);
see also Larry R. Churchill, Toward a More Robust Autonomy: Revising the
Belmont Report, in BELMONT REVISITED 111, 111 (James F. Childress et al.
eds., 2005) (criticizing the Belmont Report's "weak and distorted understanding of self-determination"); Richard A. Epstein, Defanging IRBs: Replacing
Coercion with Information, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 735, 741-45 (2007) (discussing
the Belmont Report's conceptual errors). For a more critical view on the licensing of research performed on human subjects, see Philip Hamburger, Getting
Permission, 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 405, 406-10 (2007).
7. See DANIEL DEFOE, ROBINSON CRUSOE 234, 302 (Thomas Keymer ed.,
Oxford 2007) (1719). The original Robinson Crusoe was said to have spent
twenty-seven years in isolation on a tropical island located somewhere in the
Caribbean.
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in which it merely certifies various products as "safe and
effective." In the latter role, the FDA would not have a
monopoly position but would rather act as one of many
certification agencies that offer advice on what drugs to use and
what drugs to avoid. Indeed, it is just this position that I wish
to defend. My thesis is that we should remove, or at least
sharply curtail, FDA control of the licensing of new drugs. This
thesis will sound harsh to individuals who instinctively accept
the proposition that the government's police power gives it the
unquestioned right to regulate for the health and safety of the
population.8
To demonstrate this thesis, my analysis concentrates largely on that part of the medical thicket where the case for FDA
oversight is normally thought to be at its zenith: the use of cancer drugs which are fraught with evident side effects, many of
which can prove fatal. In dealing with this issue, I freely admit
that I have no expertise on any matters that deal with the relative merits of the various therapies that are, or may be, used to
attack cancer. Those tasks should be left to patients in conjunction with their own doctors, often on the strength of knowledge
acquired from nongovernment sources. I do, however, think
that a lawyer has something to contribute to understanding the
institutional arrangements that are likely to lead to responsible
individual decisions. In making this case, I start from the classical liberal presumption that government intervention must be
regarded as a bad until it is shown to be a good. 9
That presumption rests on two grounds, both fully applicable to the FDA. First, intervention requires administrative expenditures by the state and imposes compliance costs on the
parties. The imposition of these social costs can be justified only
8. Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized the government's sweeping
power to protect the population's health:
Nothing in the history of the 1938 Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act,
which first established procedures for review of drug safety, or of the
1962 Amendments, which added the current safety and effectiveness
standards in § 201(p)(1), suggests that Congress intended protection
only for persons suffering from curable diseases.

. .

. Both Reports

note with approval the FDA's policy of considering effectiveness when
passing on the safety of drugs prescribed for "life-threatening disease."
United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 552-53 (1979) (footnotes omitted).
9. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Active Liberty: A ProgressiveAlternative to Textualism and Originalism?,119 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2391 (2006) (reviewing STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY (2005)) ("The classical liberal tra-

dition emphasizes limited government, checks and balances, and strong
protection of individual rights.").
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by pointing to some collateral gain in the quality and safety of
medical decisions. Second, the incentives of self-interested individuals, acting in political settings, do not benefit from the
"invisible hand" presumption that dates back to Adam Smith.' 0
There is no necessary alignment between public welfare and
the exercise of public power, such as exists in competitive markets. The invisible-hand analogy is equally inapplicable to administrative agencies, which operate on their own internal imperatives. In many cases, the public interest might require that
drugs be released on the market. Yet an agency concerned with
criticism and public scrutiny will not do so, knowing that it is
harder to hold it responsible for the death and pain that it did
not prevent than for the death and pain that it caused. To
make the point in quasi-medical terms, I have coined the term
"permititis"-the ability of government agencies to block voluntary personal decisions-which should be presumptively regarded as a danger to be avoided rather than as a progressive
development worthy of social support backed by public funds.
Sound social policy places a heavy burden on any government exercise of its permit power that has such a stark impact
on the lives of ordinary citizens, without their consent, and often over their protest. Even though FDA regulations are nominally directed at pharmaceutical companies, their effects are
necessarily felt by the individuals who are prevented from purchasing their products. In imposing its will, the state wrongly
substitutes its judgment for that of individuals. Sick people
should be able to decide as a matter of right whether to assume
the manifest risks of certain treatments in the hopes of receiving some greater gain.

10. Adam Smith explains the "invisible hand" presumption as follows:
[E]very individual necessarily labours to render the annual revenue
of the society as great as he can. He generally, indeed, neither intends
to promote the public interest, nor knows how much he is promoting
it. By preferring the support of domestic to that of foreign industry,
he intends only his own security; and by directing that industry in
such a manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends
only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an
invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention.
Nor is it always the worse for the society that it was no part of it. By
pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society
more effectually than when he really intends to promote it. I have
never known much good done by those who affected to trade for the
public good.
ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF

NATIONS 423 (Edwin Cannan ed., Random House, Inc. 1937) (1776).
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To justify its assertion of power, the state must show, at a
minimum, that the decisions it makes for other people are better than the decisions that they would otherwise make for
themselves. Indeed, the level of improvement should be great
enough to offset their loss of personal liberty-an intangible
but critical value-above and beyond the administrative costs
of the system. That burden is frequently met when the government seeks to control activities that may harm others, as with
pollution and contagion." The FDA, however, does not guard
against harm to strangers, but only against potential harms
that individuals may or may not inflict upon themselves. In
this context, the threshold for government intervention should
be even higher.
Any evaluation of the FDA's performance in permitting
drugs and devices must examine the sources of error in both
public and private decision-making. This comparison cannot be
properly made if it only contrasts the knowledge of government
agents with that of individual patients, even when acting under
the advice of a physician. The key to any global assessment on
relative institutional competence also depends on whether
various private voluntary organizations-both for-profit and
non-profit-serve as effective intermediaries for collecting and
organizing information in ways that improve the caliber of
patient treatment decisions. These intermediate organizations
should not be dismissed as some social will-of-the-wisp, for they
occupy a distinctive and powerful niche in virtually all areas of
social life. Generally, autonomous individuals do not crave
personal isolation; rather, they wish to control their own
destiny in cooperation with others. 12 Getting the right forms of
organization is not easy if their only interactions take place on
a one-on-one basis, where the social landscape becomes even
more dense. Trade and social associations often act as critical
liaisons between the individual and the state, either by
aggregating preferences to affect political decisions or by
11. See LAWRENCE 0. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DuTY, RESTRAINT 16-17 (2008) (discussing broadly the regulation of harmful activities);
Mark Hall, The Scope and Limits of Public Health Law, 46 PERSP. BIOL. &
MED. S199, S204-05 (Supp. 2003) (discussing the critical role of regulating
pollution and contagion specifically). For a rejoinder to Gostin, see Richard A.
Epstein, In Defense of the "Old"Public Health: The Legal Framework for the
Regulation of Public Health, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1421, 1425-28 (2004).
12. Cf. Epstein, supra note 4, at 564 (arguing that an autonomous individual is properly defined as one who has an awareness of how his or her actions affect others).
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collecting information for their members. 13 This pooling of
resources generates more reliable information at a lower cost
and helps to overcome coordination problems without the need
for government coercion. 14 That information is, of course, not
perfect, which is one reason why a multiplicity of sources
allows for each organization to impose its checks on the other.
Indeed, these types of intermediaries are commonplace for
all serious diseases, serving as a clearinghouse for medical information.15 Many are managed by families of individuals who
have suffered or died from serious diseases. 16 Others are run
commercially17 or by professional medical societies.1 8 Given the
ubiquitous, long-term presence of these private institutions or
patient groups, the critical question is whether a rigid state
13. See ROBERT D. REID & DAVID C. BOJANIC, HOSPITALITY MARKETING
MANAGEMENT 214 (4th ed. 2006) ("[T]rade associations collect information
from their members and then provide industry averages that can be used to
measure a firm's relative importance.").
14. Cf. Arnold J. Rosoff, Consumer-Driven Health Care: Questions, Cautions, and an Inconvenient Truth, 28 J. LEGAL MED. 11, 24-25 (2007) (suggesting that as consumers become more involved in the healthcare marketplace
"there will be increasing pressure on providers to make information available"
and "mechanisms of various sorts, governmental and private, will evolve to
assure that information is reliable and up to date").
15. See, e.g., AMERICAN CANCER SOCIETY, TREATMENT DECISION TOOLS
(2009), http://www.cancer.org/docroot/ETO/eto_ la.asp?from=fast/ (providing
extensive information about various cancers and available treatments).
16. See, e.g., ALS Worldwide, http://www.alsworldwide.org/ (last visited
Oct. 21, 2009) (noting that ALS Worldwide, which deals with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, or Lou Gehrig's disease, was created by Stephen and Barbara
Byer after losing their son to ALS).
17. See Amy P. Abernethy et al., Systematic Review: Reliability of Compendia Methods for Off-Label Oncology Indications, 150 ANNALS INTERNAL
MED. 336, 336-37 (2009) (listing the following compendia of cancer treatment
information: American Hospital Formulary Service Drug Information, United
States Pharmacopeia Drug Information for the Health Professional (now
known as "DrugPoints"), DRUGDEX Information System, Drug Facts and
Comparisons, NCCN, and Clinical Pharmacology). The databases Abernethy
lists are available only for commercial subscribers.
18. One example, the Consortium for Citizens With Disabilities, serves as
a clearinghouse of information on a range of health care topics, and is comprised of nearly one hundred member organizations who operate together to
advocate for national public policy measures. See Consortium for Citizens
With Disabilities, http://www.c-c-d.org (last visited Oct. 21, 2009). Another, the
International Lyme and Associated Diseases Society, provides a forum for
medical professionals dedicated to the proper diagnosis and treatment of Lyme
and its associated diseases through reviewing clinical research programs and
providing material, advice, and education for physicians and healthcare providers. See International Lyme and Associated Diseases Society, http://www
.ilads.org (last visited Oct. 21, 2009).
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permit and certification system can outperform them where
there exists an incentive to speed up delivery of accurate information about cancer therapies to their patients. I do not
think that this burden can be met. The critique here is not directed toward the performance of individual officials and scientists inside the FDA, but rather to the basic structure that defines its institutional role as a comprehensive regulator. No
grant of monopoly power is justified if private groups are able
to provide better information to potential end users at lower
costs than the state.
To make this case I proceed in several steps. Part I deals
with how to analyze the two types of errors that arise in any
context that requires decision-making under conditions of uncertainty. In so doing, it first identifies the costs that should be
minimized and then argues that in any rational-choice environment those costs should be the sum of errors from over- and
undertreatment, without regard to whether the harm in question is caused by a therapeutic agent or a natural cause. Part II
uses the same imperfect cost/benefit techniques to argue that
any error analysis will require that all persons, whether as
regulators, physicians, or patients obtain reliable information
to minimize the costs of error. Part III examines the relative
case for coercive and private action. It concludes that state
coercion is necessary for dealing with adulteration and counterfeiting but has little useful role in cancer cases, where information processing can be done more efficiently by a wide range of
private parties. Part IV examines the underlying pattern of
centralized control within the FDA and concludes that this
kind of control works no better in medicine than anywhere else.
Part V finishes with an examination of two major difficulties of
the FDA's centralized processes, namely its inability to continuously update its decisions and its vulnerability with respect
to political and economic influences. A brief conclusion follows.
Conspicuously missing from this outline is the role of tort liability under either product liability or medical malpractice. The
complications from these claims are legion, but one fact that defines the field is this: the precarious position of all serious cancer patients is such that the damages from tort liability are so
small that pursuit of these remedies is a rarity. The regulatory
system dominates the field.
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I. CAUSATION AND COST/BENEFIT ANALYSIS
Any analysis of FDA procedures for evaluating drug usage
must take into account the two forms of error associated with
all decisions under conditions of uncertainty. Type I error, or a
false positive, arises when the FDA approves a drug that causes net harm. 19 Type II error, or a false negative, arises from the
regulatory decision to keep drugs off the market that have a
positive expected value in use for at least some identifiable set
of patients. 20 The key point here is that FDA regulation does
not occur in a vacuum. Where it keeps a drug off the market, it
precludes any individualized cost/benefit analysis that patients
and physicians can make as to whether to use drugs already
approved for use. Where it lets a drug onto the market, this
second filter still remains in place.
In working through these calculations at either stage, both
the FDA and individual patients must avoid drawing philosophical, moral, or functional distinctions between any harm
caused by the treatment and any caused by the disease. It is
difficult to ignore that distinction in this context because it is
often so relevant in other identifiable legal contexts. 21 More
specifically, the early tort law governing liability in personal injury cases concentrated on situations where one person's actions caused harm to a stranger, either intentionally or by inadvertence. 22 Hitting other individuals or creating dangerous
latent conditions are the paradigmatic illustrations of these
cases. 23 For example, it matters whether a boulder that landed
on a plaintiff was set in motion by natural forces or by the actions of a human being. Why? Because generally the positive
law does not impose any individual duty on one person to guard
19. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, OVERDOSE: How EXCESSIVE GOVERNMENT
REGULATION STIFLES PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION 116-18 (2006).

20. See id.
21. See Richard A. Epstein, Medical Malpractice: The Case for Contract,
1 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 87, 94-110, 122, 130 (1976); Richard A. Epstein, The
Path to The T.J. Hooper: Of Custom and Due Care, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4-5,
19-20 (1992). The distinction is found in many, but by no means all, cases.
See, e.g., Holland v. Pitocchelli, 13 N.E.2d 390, 390-91 (Mass. 1938) (noting
the distinction); Farwell v. Boston & Worcester R.R., 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 49, 6061 (1842) (illustrating the distinction's historical use); Pfaffenbach v. White
Plains Express Corp., 216 N.E.2d 324, 325-26 (N.Y. 1966) (Burke, J., concurring) (applying the distinction).
22. See generally Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J.
LEGAL STUD. 151, 166-89 (1973) (discussing the various causal paradigms in
stranger cases).
23. See id. at 166-68, 177-79.
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against natural misfortunes that befall another. 24 It does, however, hold any individual responsible for damages inflicted on a
stranger when the defendant's conduct is not beneficial. 25
It should be noted, however, that the liability scheme in
the stranger case is wholly inapplicable in medical treatment
settings since the parties are not strangers but rather persons
joined together in some special relationship. One potent reason
to encourage the deliberateinfliction of harm is the expectation
that an aggressive response to medical threats will cause less
harm than the treatment eliminates, which is why cancer patients tolerate drugs known to have dreadful side effects. 26 The
parties' voluntary interactions in making health care decisions
logically rests on their expectation of mutual benefit. To isolate
the planned harms for rebuke without offsetting their associated benefits is to deny the rationality of the whole decisionmaking process. People undergo a course of treatment not to
minimize the risk of a Type I error, where they could be killed
or harmed by drug therapy, but rather in an attempt to minimize the sum of errors in both directions, no matter whether
caused by natural events or by human intervention. They do so
because they will only be able to reach their highest levels of
personal happiness if they take both kinds of errors into account. To stress one kind of error to the exclusion of the other
leads to needless sacrifices of personal satisfaction.
The failure to identify the proper goal of medical decisionmaking has led to serious distortions in health care policy
generally. One central precept of medical ethics relates to the
sovereign power that each individual has to refuse various
forms of medical treatment. 27 No physician or government can
force any competent individual, however foolish, to accept
treatment against her will. 2 8 This notion is based on a social
understanding that no individual should be required to take
the risk, or suffer the harm, associated with the administration
of medical treatment. Decisions to refuse treatment are
personal. Individuals may, and usually do, seek advice from
24. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965); Francis H. Bohlen, The Moral Duty to Aid Others as a Basis of Tort Liability, 56 U. PA. L.
REV. 217, 218-20 (1908).

See Bohlen, supra note 24, at 219.
See ABELOFF'S CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 459-81 (Martin D. Abeloff et al.
eds., 4th ed. 2008) (listing side effects of various chemotherapeutic cancer
drugs).
27. See Epstein, supra note 4, at 569.
28. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
25.

26.
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others before making their choices, but the final decision is
theirs. The willingness to allow stupid decisions does not stem
from the desire to expand human suffering, but from more
salient considerations. Individuals have better knowledge of
their own subjective preferences, which is why the modern law
inclines strongly to imposing a duty to disclose on physicians so
that patients can link their subjective preferences to reliable
information about the consequences of various alternatives. 29
In addition, people will devote more attention to making the
correct health care decisions when they cannot be secondguessed. After all, investments in information only yield a
positive return to the extent that they are the basis of
individual action. If people were certain that others would
override their individual choices, any effort to get better
information would be a pure waste that yielded no positive
return. At that point no one would make even the simplest
inquiry. By extension, the greater the likelihood that the state
will override choice, the less people will invest in making
responsible choices. The state should, of course, provide some
protection against fraud, but in most cases the best way to do
this is through lawsuits against the supplier of fraudulent
information. 30 A decrease in permits issued by the FDA is a
classic instance of regulatory overkill.
In modern health care settings, our understanding of personal autonomy is altered when the question turns to the right
of any individual to accept medical treatment that could cause
harm, alleviate suffering, or both. While the language of autonomous choice is often invoked in this discussion, the subtext is
noticeably different. Commonly, proponents of FDA oversight
argue that an agency or board should protect autonomous individuals of limited ability from making their own choices, lest
they make too many mistakes. The legal approach slides im-

29. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 790 (D.C. Cir. 1972) ("[T]he
very purpose of the disclosure rule is to protect the patient against consequences which, if known, he would have avoided by foregoing the treatment.").
For a discussion of the cross-currents between objective and subjective choices,
see Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899, 956-59
(1994).
30. See, e.g., Alex Berenson, 33 States to Get $62 Million in Zyprexa Case
Settlement, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2008, at B7 (reporting that state-initiated lawsuits against drug company Eli Lilly for improperly marketing the antipsychotic medication Zyprexa netted the largest consumer protection settlement
in history).
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perceptibly but inexorably from self-determination to paternalism. 31
Within this framework, therefore, the principle of patient
autonomy accords equal weight to the right to receive drug
treatment and the right to refuse it. To raise the ante for drug
approval on the grounds that it is "worse" to kill than to let die
goes against the basic effort to maximize the personal gains
from the receipt of health care. 32 The individual patient tries to
minimize the sum of the two kinds of error and will adopt any
strategy where the expected outcomes yield a gain that is
greater than the cost of treatment. It is critical to note, however, that FDA incentives are not aligned with a patient's expected value calculations. All agencies are subject to political
pressures which occur when decisions cause traceable, visible
harms. 3 3 The harms that are caused by particular therapeutic
agents-such as thalidomide, which causes major limb deformitieS34-attract immense political pressures to ban these dangerous products from the marketplace. 35 Overall, the result is a
strong bias to overweigh Type I error relative to the quiet
harms that arise when individuals die for want of therapeutic
agents that languish unapproved within the FDA.
It is for this reason that many, but by no means all, patient
groups tend to be more vocal than the FDA about allowing new
therapies on the market. 36 Additionally, appeals by families to
31. See, e.g., United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 552-53 (1979)
(holding that Congress passed the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act and the 1962
Amendments to the Act in part to shield and protect terminally ill patients).
32. See EPSTEIN, supra note 19, at 116-18.
33. See Brief for John E. Calfee et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 5, Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009) (No. 06-1249) (explaining
that the FDA knows it faces more heat when it commits the visible Type I error of letting bad drugs on the market than the invisible Type II error of keeping good drugs off the market). As a matter of social utility, the two errors are
of equal magnitude. See EPSTEIN, supra note 19, at 116-18.
34. See HARVEY TEFF & COLIN MUNRO, THALIDOMIDE: THE LEGAL AFTERMATH 4-6 (1976).

35. See id. at 122 (documenting President John F. Kennedy's call for increased regulation of drugs in his 1962 State of the Union address in response
to thalidomide's dangerous side effects).
36. See, e.g., The International Myeloma Foundation, the MDS Foundation and a Coalition of Patient Advocacy Organizations Call for Updated Rules
for Reimbursement, Access and Approvals for New and Existing Cancer
Treatments, http://myeloma.org/main.jsp?type=article&id=2651 (outlining a
"Statement of Principles" issued on behalf of patients and caregivers demanding that policies for early approval of new cancer treatments be "reformed and
streamlined" and that "an efficient and effective mechanism" be created to allow patients to access experimental treatments).
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allow experimental uses of drugs that lack FDA approval are
also common. 37 In these cases, the FDA is reluctant to allow
deviation from its norms because it may undermine the usefulness of clinical trials. 38 Clinical trials, however, are often too
little or too late for ailing individuals. 39 Most patients do not
ask whether a new treatment meets some abstract standard of
statistical significance, which says that there is a ninety-five
percent chance of some positive result. They do not have that
luxury. Rather, they want to know whether the new drug gives
them a chance, however small, to improve their status quo.
Some measure of how this works is the sad story of Abigail
Burroughs, who died of squamous cell carcinoma at age twentyone. At this point the story runs as follows:
Not long after her diagnosis, the Burroughs family learned
of an investigational cancer drug, Erbitux, that showed good
response in early trials. Abigail's prominent oncologist at Johns
Hopkins Hospital believed the drug had a significant chance of
saving her life. But every effort on the part of her family, physician, and supporters to procure the drug for Abigail failed. She
was ineligible for a clinical trial and the drug company couldn't
provide her with Erbitux for compassionate use. The FDA was
unmoved by her life-and-death situation. 40 Abigail died on June
9, 2001.41 On February 12, 2004, the FDA approved Erbitux "to
treat patients with advanced colorectal cancer that has spread
to other parts of the body."4 2
After her death, Abigail's father, Frank Burroughs,
founded the Abigail Alliance, which promptly initiated a major
37. See, e.g., Amy Harmon, Fightingfor a Last Chance at Life, N.Y. TIMES,
May 16, 2009, § 1, at 1 (documenting the struggles of one family's appeal to
the FDA for the experimental use of an unapproved drug).
38. See id. ("The F.D.A. itself does not want patients to bypass clinical trials, which require that some patients receive a placebo to determine reliably
whether a drug works.").
39. See Alexander Kamb et al., Why Is Cancer Drug Discovery So Difficult?, 6 NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 115, 115 (2007) ("Oncology has one of

the poorest records for investigational drugs in clinical development, with success rates that are more than three times lower than for cardiovascular diseases.").
40. Sue Kovach, The Abigail Alliance Motivated by Tragic Circumstances,
Families Battle an Uncaring Bureaucracy, LIFE EXTENSION (SPEcIAL EDITION), 2007, at 25, 26.
41. The Abigail Story, http://abigail-alliance.org/story.htm (last visited Oct.
21, 2009).

42. News Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Approves Erbitux for
Colorectal Cancer (Feb. 12, 2004), available at http://www.fda.gov/News
Events/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/2004/ucml08244.htm.
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litigation effort to insist that the autonomy interests of individual patients give them a constitutional right to take, with or
without FDA approval, any drug that has passed Stage I clinical trials. 43 Their proposal met an initial round of success by a
three-judge panel in Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach,but was ultimately and decisively quashed when the case was reheard en banc. 44 The
court en banc held that FDA authority over health matters is
wholly consistent with American constitutional traditions under which "the democratic branches are better suited to decide
the proper balance between the uncertain risks and benefits of
medical technology, and are entitled to deference in doing so." 4 5
Why this deference to democratic institutions? The case
does not involve the provision of any standard type of public
good, and the argument is phrased with such generality that it
would justify political institutions forcing technology on unwilling individuals. Moreover, it would surely require overruling
decisions such as Griswold v. Connecticut,46 on the ground that
rights to privacy must yield to the ability of democratic institutions to decide which individuals should have access to contraceptives and why.
It is hard to sustain any close examination of the competing individual and state interests on the all too generous standard of Abigail Alliance. Put otherwise, the breadth of this deference claim seems to dispense with any close examination of
the state interest that is put forward to limit individual autonomy. Yet any particularized review of the evidence shows the
weakness of the government's case. It is surely understandable,
by way of comparison, that individuals do not have the constitutional right to assisted suicide, as the Supreme Court held in
Washington v. Glucksberg47 and Vacco v. Quill.48 To be sure,
people have a strong autonomy interest in ending their own
lives when the anticipated pain is greater than any future joys
from living. But there are risks as well, given the fragile competence of people in end-of-life situations and the risk of family
43. See Jerome Groopman, The Right to a Trial, NEW YORKER, Dec. 18,
2006, at 40, 40 (explaining the formation and goals of the Abigail Alliance).
44. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von
Eschenbach, 445 F.3d 470, 486 (D.C. Cir. 2006), rev'd en banc, 495 F.3d 695,
713 (D.C. Cir. 2007); see also Epstein, supra note 4, at 574-76.
45. Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 713.
46. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
47. 521 U.S. 702, 735 (1997).
48. 521 U.S. 793, 797 (1997).
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members who may prefer to bring about their early deaths. In
Abigail Burroughs's case, the individual patient was seeking
life, not death, and the perceived conflicts of interest among
family members looked to be at a low ebb. 49 Additionally, when
patients are not eligible for clinical trials there is no colorable
claim that individual "opt-outs" will make it more difficult to
secure accurate information about drugs, one of the constant
laments of the professional clinical trial organizations.50 And
even when those difficulties arise, as they commonly do, it is a
frightening prospect to think that the FDA can block individuals from seeking the treatment of their choice in order to fill its
ever-expanding rolls for clinical trials. To be sure, there is always a real risk of quackery and deception in dealing with cancer treatments.51 In all cases, however, these drugs can only be
used under the supervision of a physician who remains subject
to the ordinary tort and administrative law remedies for touting products that are known to be useless or worse. 52
It should be evident, therefore, that the policy dimensions
of this dispute have not been put to rest by the en banc decision
in Abigail Alliance. The real question does not concern collective choice through legislation, but rather individual choice on
matters of unique personal importance. The decision in Abigail
Alliance, which blindly praised legislative deference, offers no
instruction on how legislation should proceed. 53 And it undoub-

49. See Kovach, supra note 40, at 26-28.
50. See Expanded Availability of Investigational New Drugs Through a
Parallel Track Mechanism for People With AIDS and Other HIV-Related Disease, 57 Fed. Reg. 13,250, 13,252 (Apr. 15, 1992) (explaining that "parallel
track" programs that make investigational drugs accessible only to patients
who do not meet the eligibility requirements for a clinical trial will not impair
the clinical trial process).
51. See, e.g., United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 558 (1978) (describing how "resourceful entrepreneurs" have historically marketed fraudulent concoctions and treatments to vulnerable patients); see also Corrected En
Banc Brief for the Appellees at 35-36, Abigail Alliance for Better Access to
Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (No.
04-5350) ("The history of drug use in the nineteenth century is a history of
quackery and fraud, of desperate patients throwing away their money and
their health on elixirs that did everything except cure diseases and save
lives.").
52. For a discussion of ordinary claims against physicians with respect to
prescribing drugs, see Lauren Krohn, Cause of Action Against Physician for
Negligence in PrescribingDrugs Or Medicines, in 9 CAUSES OF ACTION 1, 6-66
(Wesley H. Winborne ed., 1986).
53. See Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 713.
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tedly sidestepped the serious question of whether legislative intervention in personal precincts is justified as a matter of right.
With the constitutional battle lost in Abigail Alliance, the
struggle has now switched to the legislative and administrative
arenas. What rules should Congress and the FDA adopt with
respect to experimental and off-label uses of drugs that have
already been approved in some fashion? The current legal
framework gives the FDA power to regulate the use of new
drugs, but does not give it the power to practice medicine,
which in effect facilitates off-label uses of drugs. 54 Once a drug
is on the market, the FDA cannot tell physicians how to use it.
Physicians rely on trial and error, without the rigor or delay of
clinical trials; anecdotal information spreads fairly quickly in a
bottom-up fashion, often based on hunches, which is why surveys indicate that physicians strongly favor the continuation of
off-label uses.5 5 This sharing of information, however, is retarded because the legal regime makes it flatly illegal for drug
companies to promote any off-label uses. 56 The FDA justifies its
position as follows:
Permitting Sponsors to Promote Off-Label Uses: Would diminish
or eliminate incentive to study the use and obtain definitive data[;]
Could result in harm to patients from unstudied uses that actually
lead to bad results, or that are merely ineffective[;] Would diminish
the use of evidence-based medicine[;] Could ultimately erode the effi57
cacy standard.
54. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 301 (2006). For
an exhaustive discussion of this issue, see Sandra H. Johnson, PollutingMedical Judgment? False Assumptions in the Pursuit of False Claims Regarding
Off-Label Prescribing,9 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 61, 69-70 (2008).
55. See Daniel B. Klein & Alexander Tabarrok, Do Off-Label Drug Practices Argue Against FDA Efficacy Requirements? A Critical Analysis of Physicians' Argumentation for Initial Efficacy Requirements, 67 AM. J. ECON. &
SOC. 743, 750 (2008) ("Of 492 physicians answering the question [of whether
the FDA should restrict off-label uses], 460 opposed ending the freedom to prescribe off-label.").
56. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(a), 331(d) (2006) (prohibiting marketing unapproved drugs); id. § 352(f) (defining a drug or device as "misbranded" if not
properly labeled with directions for its use); see also U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GOOD REPRINT PRACTICES FOR THE DISTRIBUTION OF MEDICAL JOURNAL
ARTICLES AND MEDICAL OR SCIENTIFIC REFERENCE PUBLICATIONS ON UNAPPROVED NEW USES OF APPROVED DRUGS AND APPROVED OR CLEARED MEDICAL

DEVICES (2009), http://www.fda.gov/oc/op/goodreprint.html ("An approved new
drug that is marketed for an unapproved use is an unapproved new drug with
respect to that use. An approved drug that is marketed for an unapproved use
. . . is misbranded because the labeling of such drug does not include 'adequate
directions for use."') (citations omitted).
57. Janet Woodcock, A Shift in the Regulatory Approach (June 23, 1997)
(on file with the Minnesota Law Review) (PowerPoint presentation outlining

AGAINST PERMITITIS

2009]1

17

There is a real bite to these words. Pharmaceutical companies that have so behaved have been hit with heavy fines, including a settlement of $455 million for Pfizer5 8 and a $700 million settlement fee on Serono Labs. 59 In addition to being liable
for their own off-label promotion, pharmaceutical companies
may be held liable for assisting the generic makers in their
promotion of a drug's off-label use.60 These are not trivial exposures.
The legal situation with drugs that have yet to be approved
is quite different because physicians are unable to use an unapproved drug as a therapy, as was the case with Abigail Burroughs. 6 1 Patients face stark challenges in obtaining these unapproved drugs, including the possibility of enrolling in clinical
trials where they may receive a placebo instead of the drug or
seeking a compassionate use exemption from the FDA to use an
unapproved drug on an experimental basis. 62 Compassionate
use exemptions are exceedingly difficult to obtain because the
the reasons for FDA policies on off-label uses); see also Final Guidance on Industry-Supported Scientific and Educational Activities, 62 Fed. Reg. 64,074,
64,081 (Dec. 3, 1997) (describing how banning promotion of unapproved uses
"protect[s] the public health by preserving the integrity of the premarket approval process" and maintains an incentive for manufacturers to conduct clinical investigations, thus "encouraging scientific research and eliminating unnecessary harms to patients"); On Biostatistics and Clinical Trial,
http://onbiostatistics.blogspot.com/2009/02/evidence-based-medicine-evidence
-gap.html (Feb. 14, 2009, 15:27 EST) (explaining the FDA's rationale for prohibiting promotion of off-label uses). See generally David L. Sackett et al., Evidence Based Medicine: What It Is and What It Isn't, 312 BRIT. MED. J. 71
(1996) (discussing the usefulness of and fears associated with the practice of
evidence-based medicine).
58. See Johnson, supra note 54, at 114 (describing how the pharmaceutical company Parke-Davis paid over $455 million as a result of litigation concerning the drug Neurontin). Parke-Davis was a division of Warner-Lambert,
which later merged with Pfizer. Id. at 103 n.169.
59. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Serono to Pay $704 Million for the
Illegal Marketing of AIDS Drug (Oct. 17, 2005), available at http://justice
.gov/opalpr/2005/October/05_civ_545.html. For a discussion of some of the
First Amendment issues arising from FDA restriction of pharmaceutical promotion to physicians, see Aaron S. Kesselheim & Jerry Avorn, Pharmaceutical
Promotion to Physiciansand First Amendment Rights, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1727, 1727-28 (2008).

60. Amaris Elliott-Engel, Drug Companies on the Hook for Off-Label Use
of Generic, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 24, 2008, http://www.law.com/jsp/pal
PubArticlePA.jsp?id=900005506685.
61. See Kovach, supra note 40, at 26-27.
62.

See AMERICAN CANCER SOCIETY, COMPASSIONATE DRUG USE (2009),

http://www.cancer.org/docroot/ETO/content/ETO_1_2x-CompassionateDrug
Use.asp.
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FDA can impose all sorts of preconditions which take months or
years to satisfy. 63 Drug companies often impose additional hurdles to the availability of these unapproved drugs because they
are worried about tort liability and their ability to recover the
costs for the new treatments.
One recent illustration of this tortuous process involves the
long battle over the use of the drug Iplex, which was believed to
relieve some symptoms of amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS),
or Lou Gehrig's disease.6 4 The New York Times recently chronicled the efforts of Joshua Thompson's family to gain access to
the drug Iplex. 6 5 Iplex was not immediately available to the
public due to a patent dispute between Insmed and Genentech. 66 Other drug choices, however, were limited because the
FDA only had one approved drug on the market for ALS, with
limited effectiveness, and another drug possibly scheduled for
clinical trials. 67 Thompson was only able to procure a drug
similar to Iplex, and only after difficulty. One doctor, for example, refused to prescribe it because of the risk of hypoglycemia,
or low blood sugar.68 Nonetheless, Thompson wanted to try Iplex based on positive reports. 69 Some doctors backed Thompson's choice, but the issue quickly became a public administrative nightmare in which the FDA initially denied permission
before finally relenting in April 2009.70 By then, Thompson had
contracted pneumonia and was put on a ventilator, which often
marks the beginning of the end. Iplex, unfortunately, cannot
reverse any prior deterioration.7 1 Better late than never does
not make late better than early.
Iplex may be a dead end. Life is lived, however, going forward, which makes the correct question whether state intervention improved Thompson's odds of survival. That question
involves a delicate valuation on different states of disease and
hard judgments on the probability of divergent outcomes. The
answer to this question does not tip the balance back toward
the FDA permit system, for it is still the case that harms in63. See id. (describing requirements for access to unapproved new cancer
drugs outside of a clinical trial).
64. See Harmon, supra note 37.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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flicted by medical treatment are no more deadly than those inflicted by nature. Individual patients, in consultation with their
physicians, undoubtedly make a raft of key decisions about
their course of treatment. If patients are capable of making
choices among a variety of approved treatments, why should
they be deprived of the right to make that choice among the
class of treatments that have not been approved?
One frequent objection is that desperate patients could be
swayed by false optimism or bad information, perhaps through
advertisements. 7 2 1 took the position in a recent Wall Street
Journal editorial that once drugs pass through Phase I trials
(which are intended to deal with matters of toxicity), patients
should then be free to take any drug combination they choose,
even if they have not gone through the more extensive Phase II
and Phase III trials (which are intended to deal with matters of
efficacy). 73 The column elicited comments from many who were
frustrated with the current system 74 and the use of the Phase I
72. See MARCIA ANGELL, THE TRUTH ABOUT THE DRUG COMPANIES: How
THEY DECEIVE US AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT 135-55 (2004) (discussing the

conflict of interest inherent in drug companies' advertising and educating others about their own products); JEROME KASSIRER, ON THE TAKE: How MEDICINE'S COMPLICITY WITH BIG BUSINESS CAN ENDANGER YOUR HEALTH 50-63,
79-103 (2004) (discussing conflicts of interest); Troyen A. Brennan et al.,
Health Industry Practices that Create Conflicts of Interest: A Policy Proposal
for Academic Medical Centers, 295 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 429, 431-32 (2006) (proposing heightened conflict of interest standards). For a critique of strong conflict of interest proposals, see Richard A. Epstein, Conflicts of Interest in
Health Care: Who Guards the Guardians,50 PERSP. BIOL. & MED. 72, 83-86
(2007) (asserting that regulators also face conflicts of interest and arguing
against overregulating conflicts of interest); Thomas Stossel, Regulation of Financial Conflicts of Interest in Medical Practice and Medical Research: A Damaging Solution in Search of a Problem, 50 PERSP. BIOL. & MED. 54, 67-69
(2007) (attacking overreactions to conflicts of interest).
73. Richard A. Epstein, Op-Ed., Cancer Patients Deserve FasterAccess to
Life-Saving Drugs, WALL ST. J., May 2, 2009, at Al.
74. Typical of the reaction was Dr. Mark Fesen, who wrote:
As an oncologist in private practice, I encounter situations similar
to this daily. In our group, we try to aggressively advocate for our patients. The bureaucratic roadblocks that we frequently run into can
be deadly serious for patients and disheartening for the staff.
One recent case involved a patient who is currently in pain suffering from a metastatic small bowel cancer. The several drugs approved
and tested for colon cancer (Avastin, Erbitux, Camptosar, and Oxaliplatinum) have and will not and will not [sic] be tested for this rare
type of cancer. Yet it makes intuitive sense to consider using them.
Due to the lack of clinical trials studying these drugs in this situation,
Medicare will not approve their use. NCCN guidelines, which follow
evidence-based medicine and clinical trials, are of little help in this
situation. Unfortunately, this patient, along with many others will
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filter, designed to weed out drugs with exceedingly high toxicities. Some readers who had experience with the FDA went even
further, contending that the FDA should lose its ability to issue
permits. 75 I do not categorically disagree with their position.
For the moment, at least, I would leave in place the requirement that a drug pass Phase I trials. If that system works
well, then perhaps even the Phase I trials could be eliminated,
thereby demoting the FDA to a certifying agency without licensing authority. Alternatively, if the expanded realm of patient choice produces serious problems, it should be possible to
dial back individual choice to control abuse. Exactly how this
approach would work in various contexts cannot be confidently
predicted in the abstract; maintaining the status quo, however,
carries with it substantial risks as well. The best approach is to
start small and to continuously work to expand individual
choice if patient access to drugs that have passed Phase I trials
produces no sign of systematic abuse.
pass away while suffering from a cancer for which useful treatment is
likely very near. My patients' only option is to risk self paying for
these expensive drugs.
E-mail from Dr. Mark Fesen, M.D., to author (May 3, 2009, 21:26 CDT) (on file
with author).
75. Here is one such email:
As someone whose first husband died of cancer at age 40 (stomach
cancer caught after it had metastasized to the liver), I appreciated
your identifying much of what we went through, but I question the
implied premise that the FDA should have any role in medicine. For
instance, I would like to address your statement: "no one thinks that
unapproved cancer drugs should be freely available to patients."
We knew that my husband's cancer was in all likelihood terminal,
but it would have been far better to have had access to some drugs in
the experimental stage than be told, as we were, to join the long waiting list for a clinical trial, which we did. By the time my husband's
name moved to the top of the list months later, he was too weak to
travel to Texas where the study was being done. He died a few weeks
later.
From your article, I believe you understand how devastating this
situation was to my husband and his family. But if government increases its role in the health care decisions of all Americans, this kind
of story will not be a rarity. Advocating "tweaks" in the present system will not suffice; it is the basic idea of government regulating medicine that must be addressed.
The answer to our health care situation is to get the government
out of the health care business and institute a completely free-market
approach, getting rid of mandates and regulations that make the
present system less than optimal in some cases, and disastrous in
others. I hope you will consider arguments made by people like Paul
Hsieh (www.WeStandFirm.org) in your thinking on this subject.
E-mail from anonymous reader to author (May 4, 2009, 15:25 CDT) (on file
with author).
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The argument for expanded patient choice rests on the
proposition that the system already supports personal autonomy in healthcare. Quite simply, identical risks arise when individual physicians and patients are forced, as they always are,
to make choices among lawful therapies. Do sufferers of prostate cancer prefer radiation, surgery, chemotherapy, pellets, or
some combination thereof? 76 No one argues that the power of
choice should be withdrawn from individual patients because of
the distinct possibility that they will erroneously exercise it.
The usual response is to counsel prudence in making private
decisions, or, more dubiously, to impose procedural hurdlessuch as counseling-before allowing individuals to make certain decisions. The response is not to ban the ability to make
those decisions. It is a mistake to throw out the baby with the
bathwater by assuming that personal imperfections in decisionmaking require a collective decision to disallow certain drugs
from entering the market. The combination of institutional diligence, procedural safeguards, and self-help is the preferred
response.
II. GATHERING GOOD INFORMATION
The need to make decisions under conditions of uncertainty
is especially critical in cancer cases, where the costs of error are
measured in life-and-death terms. Time is of the essence in
responding to tumor growth; the earlier the time of detection,
the likelier the prospects of beneficial treatment. 77 At the same
time, the high toxicity of most cancer agents means that the
use of the wrong compound or drug (or the wrong dosages of the
right compound) could lead to either serious discomfort, earlier
death, or both.78 The upside of proper treatment is usually low
because curing certain cancers may well be a remote possibility. Frequently, the patient's best hope is to prolong her life by
years or even months, and perhaps, but not necessarily, improve her quality of life. Any insistence that approved cancer
drugs will result in a complete cure would make the best the
enemy of the good, given that perfection is unattainable. Not
even the FDA insists on that. Usual treatment protocols call for
the use of multiple drugs in sequence, starting with the least
76. See ABELOFF'S CLINICAL ONCOLOGY, supra note 26, at 1667-80 (describing various prostate cancer treatments).
77. Id. at 361.
78. See id. at 459-81 (discussing chemotherapeutic drugs and their known
toxicities, or side effects).
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toxic drug, and when that treatment starts to falter, stronger
agents are tried in turn until the drug cabinet is empty.79 Physicians know this, of course, and there is little risk that they
will leapfrog to risky drugs when conventional therapies have
not yet been tried.
The grim prospect of most cancer treatment options is,
however, not improved by FDA regulation. Cancer patients are
precariously perched on the unhappy horns of an inescapable
dilemma: the high costs of inaction, often resulting in death,
versus the high costs of action, often resulting in faster death
or serious distress. A patient's decisions involve high rates of
error in both directions, where each error carries a high
expected loss. Yet however bleak the prospects, the same
methodology applies: maximize expected value in deciding on a
course of treatment, if any. Therefore, one defensible option is
hospice care without treatment, when all the alternatives look
worse.80 In making these decisions, reliable information really
matters because the illogical strategy is to base decisions solely
on the casual accretion of information. A small reduction in the
probability of an adverse outcome or short remission from
treatment could produce enormous improvements in either the
quality or length of life.
The question is often whether improvement in outcomes
for the individual (and through that person, for society) is
greater than the costs of obtaining better information. With
most naive patients, the answer is so clearly yes that no cancer
patient relies on his or her own judgment to decide which
course of therapy or nontherapy to follow. The operative inquiry should be, and often is, whether further investment in information costs less than the gain from any anticipated reduction in error costs. Since the answer is often yes, how should we
organize our systems of social control to maximize the rate of
return from private investments in additional information, given the high value of human life?8 1
79.

See id. at 451.

80.

See AMERICAN CANCER SOCIETY, WHAT IS HOSPICE CARE? (2009),

http://www.cancer.org/docroot/ETO/content/Eto_2_5x WhatIs_.sHospice Care
.asp ("Hospice care is meant for the time when cancer treatment can no longer
help you.").
81. One general conceit states that a human being should be treated as a
"six million dollar man." See Kevin Murphy & Robert Topel, DiminishingReturns?: The Costs and Benefits of Improving Health, 46 PERSP. BIOL. & MED.
S108, S110-15 (2003) (calculating the value of increasing longevity). There are
many complications here, including questions of the sensitivity of the value of
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III. GOVERNMENT MONOPOLY VERSUS VOLUNTARY
INTERMEDIARIES
The central issue, therefore, is whether the government,
voluntary institutions, or both, should be used to overcome the
pervasive information shortfalls on drug treatments. I think
that the answer here is clear. The government-run FDA should
step out of the approval and permit process-after the completion of Phase I clinical trials-thereby allowing decisions to rest
in the hands of patients and their physicians.
In this new scenario, the FDA retains a key role in protecting public health, but has little responsibility in approving or
disapproving cancer therapies. A powerful state presence is
needed, for example, to insure the health and safety of the public at large. The FDA should focus its resources on the rash of
contaminated food that has poured in from overseas and on the
extensive counterfeiting rings that seek to inject defective foods
and drugs into this nation's distribution pipeline. 82 Honest
manufacturers will go to enormous lengths by themselves to
protect their brands against perceived defects in quality, as
Johnson & Johnson did in recalling Tylenol after someone laced
its tablets with cyanide.8 3 These private efforts must be backed
by government regulations that can impose criminal sanctions
on various malefactors who try to sell dangerous or purloined
goods. Indeed, private manufacturers often welcome and adverlife to age and health conditions, but the revealed behavior suggests a high
number. The precise number does not matter so long as it is large. But the size
of the information gap sets in motion a set of private and public strategies toward data collection that shape the social organization for the provision of
cancer treatment. Improve odds by five percent and, as a first approximation,
there is substantial social gain, which if not $300,000, is still substantial.
See id. at S111. With error costs high and mistakes common, it makes sense
for everyone to invest heavily in knowledge.
82. See, e.g., Robert Cockburn et al., The Global Threat of Counterfeit
Drugs: Why Industry and Governments Must Communicate the Dangers, 4
PUB. LIBR. SCl. MED. 302, 302-08 (2005) (discussing why the government has
to counteract the risk of counterfeit drugs); Paul M. Rudolf & Ilisa B.G.
Bernstein, Counterfeit Drugs, 350 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1384, 1384-86 (2004)
(noting the rising incidence of counterfeit drugs). The process has world-wide
implications. See Roger Bate, New Tools to Fight Fake Medicines, AM. ENTERPRISE INST. FOR PUB. POL'Y RES., May 13, 2009, http://www.aei.org/article/
100492.
83. Mallenbaker.net, Companies in Crisis-What to Do When It All Goes
Wrong, http://www.mallenbaker.net/csr/crisis02.html (last visited Oct. 21,
2009) (recounting the response to incidents in 1982 and 1986 when seven
people died in Chicago after consuming cyanide-laced Tylenol, causing a loss of
one billion dollars in market value after the 1982 incident and spurring wide
recalls and the creation of tamper proof packages after the 1986 incident).
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tise "FDA-approval" to increase consumer confidence in their
products. 84
Drug treatments relating to oncology, however, are
unrelated to matters of drug purity or consumer confidence.
The distribution of cancer drugs does not require the FDA to
strengthen public communication, as might be required for
those drugs that large numbers of ordinary individuals take on
a regular basis. 85 In contrast, oncology drugs are distributed
through restricted channels and only to people who understand
how and why they are administered. 86 In instances of cancer,
patients and their doctors must assemble information to
understand the tradeoffs on the safety and the effectiveness of
drugs in their own individual cases. It is politically unwise to
give any agency, however skilled or competent, monopoly
control over whether people may use a particular drug or
therapy when it lacks the individualized calculation of whether,
for example, patients have risk factors for particular
treatments. Indeed, if the FDA rejects a new drug application,
the product or service may not be sold at all, which necessarily
has high Type II error costs. Even if the FDA allows the drug to
be marketed, it can subject it to various conditions that relate
to pricing, advertising, and permissible users, among others,
which can limit its dissemination and use.87 Additional

84. See U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Is It Really FDA Approved?, http://
www.fda.gov/ForConsumers/ConsumerUpdates/ucm047470.htm#biologics (last
visited Oct. 21, 2009) (noting some manufacturers may say their products are
"FDA-approved").
85. Cf. Posting of Peter Pitts to DrugWonks.com, http://www.drugwonks
.com/blog-post/show/4755 (Feb. 28, 2008, 10:58 EST) (describing the FDA
Commissioner's remarks about how clear FDA communication combats the
erosion of consumer trust).
86. See, e.g., American Cancer Society, FDA Approves Advanced Prostate
Cancer Drug, Dec. 2, 2003, http://www.cancer.org/docroot/NWS/content/NWS
2_lx FDA Approves Advanced ProstateCancer Drug.asp (describing a cancer drug that can only be prescribed by a limited number of doctors due to its
serious side effects).
87. Recently, the FDA has demanded a "Risk Evaluation and Mitigation
Strategy," or "REMS," in some circumstances. That requirement could undermine the present legal framework that allows doctors to make off-label uses of
drugs. See U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Questions and Answers on the Federal
Register Notice on Drugs and Biological Products Deemed to Have Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies, http://www.fda.gov/RegulatoryInformation/
Legislation/FederalFoodDrugandCosmeticActFDCAct/SignificantAmendments
totheFDCAct/FoodandDrugAdministrationAmendmentsActof2007/ucm095439
.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2009) (explaining the Identification of Drug and Biological Products Deemed to Have Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies
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requests for new data or to conduct additional clinical tests
breed further delay, which both raises treatment costs and
leads people to forego the drug's use.88 Warnings of negative
side effects, for example, are calculated to lower the
expectations of potential users. The concerns here are not
hypothetical, for just this pattern emerged with Prozac, 89 where
decreased use for treating teenage and young adult depression
is highly correlated with warnings about increases in the
suicidal behavior that Prozac allegedly causes.9 0
One implicit but incorrect assumption is that FDA competence must be compared with the joint knowledge of an individual patient and his or her physician, both of which could
prove to be limited. Defenders of the FDA are right to point out
that collective generation of the information is usually superior
to individual impressions. 91 They are wrong, however, to assume that government agencies are the only bodies that can
assemble and interpret the relevant information. It is more advisable to compare the FDA to voluntary associations, including
those that deal with oncology. 92 Individual patients and physifor Purposes of the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007,
73 Fed. Reg. 16,313, at 16,313 (Mar. 27, 2008)).
88. See The Law of Biologic Medicine: HearingBefore the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 108th Cong. 122-35 (2004) (submission of Lester M. Crawford, Acting Comm'r of Food & Drugs, Dep't of Health & Human Servs.) (noting that
faster FDA approval of drugs reduces their cost and increases their availability).
89. See, e.g., PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE 1852 (63d ed. 2009) (describing Prozac as an antidepressant that functions as a selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor (SSRI), which blocks the absorption of serotonin into the blood).
90. The abstract of one study states the following conclusion:
SSRI prescriptions for youths decreased by approximately 22% in
both the United States and the Netherlands after the warnings were
issued. In the Netherlands, the youth suicide rate increased by 49%
between 2003 and 2005 and shows a significant inverse association
with SSRI prescriptions. In the United States, youth suicide rates increased by 14% between 2003 and 2004, which is the largest year-toyear change in suicide rates in this population since the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention began systematically collecting suicide data in 1979.
Robert D. Gibbons et al., Early Evidence on the Effects of Regulators' Suicidality Warnings on SSRI Prescriptionsand Suicide in Children and Adolescents,
164 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1356, 1356 (2007).
91. See Arnold S. Relman, To Lose Trust, Every Day, NEW REPUBLIC, July
23, 2007, at 36, 40 (2007) (reviewing EPSTEIN, supra note 19).
92. Cf. Reed Abelson & Andrew Pollack, Medicare Widens Drugs It Accepts for Cancer Care, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2009, at Al (discussing new policies regarding the FDA's use of recommendations from voluntary organizations).
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cians already rely on these voluntary organizations to serve as
intermediaries between them and the manufacturers or sellers
of cancer drugs for medications that are licensed for particular
uses. 93 There is no reason why their role cannot be extended.
To understand why, recall that voluntary organizations are
not whimsical creations. Indeed they are fixtures in many contexts that are unrelated to cancer or medicine. 94 They are typically nonprofit organizations that serve the same basic intermediation function in virtually all markets: to collect, digest,
and interpret material for their members in areas where there
is an information shortfall. They set best practice standards
and convey these standards to their membership on a national
and global level, so that doctors in the United States can benefit from information obtained from Europe or Asia. 95 Unlike
government monopolies, these organizations operate by persuasion, not coercion, 96 and they act in competition with each other. Participating physician members use information from such
organizations as they will, knowing that they can report their
own experiences back to the standing body in a conscious and
continuous feedback loop. If one organization falters, as can
easily happen, others pick up the slack.9 7 So long as there is no
monopoly control, physicians can search out the best sources of
information.9 8
These groups are formed with respect to virtually every
specialty, which in turn is broken down by subspecialties. They
have budgets, 99 organized subcommittees,10 0 extensive websites, 101 clear missions, 102 and a proven ability to quickly com93.
94.

See id.
See NATIONAL TRADE AND PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS OF THE
UNITED STATES, at i-viii (Valerie S. Sheridan ed., Columbia Books, 43d ed.
2008), for a list of over 7600 trade associations in the United States, many of
which serve multiple functions.
95. See id. at ii (noting international cooperation).
96. See id. at iii ("Both membership and donor-based organizations are
heavily reliant on public trust. . . .").
97. See Abelson & Pollack, supra note 92 (noting the use of alternative
references).
98. Cf. id. (giving examples of various sources of information).
99. See id. (describing the funding systems of some groups).
100. See id. (noting the steps taken to control conflicts of interest within
committees).
101. See, e.g., American Chronic Pain Association, http://www.theacpa.org/
(last visited Oct. 21, 2009).
102. For an example of one voluntary organization's mission statement, see
id.

2009]

AGAINST PERMITITIS

27

pile complex information. 103 And they work hard to make their
databases interactive. 104 The gains from creating these intermediaries evidently dwarf the transaction costs needed to put
these groups together: if that were not the case, these groups
would not be so widespread. Within medicine they can supply
information the FDA is too hidebound to collect and disseminate. They can also go further than making a simple judgment
of whether to license by recommending the proper sequence for
the use of various cancer treatments that distinguishes firstline treatments from those of last resort.
These intermediate institutions assume special importance
because of the peculiar structure of U.S. food and drug laws,
which create a sharp distinction between on-label drug uses
that the manufacturer can promote and off-label drug uses that
manufacturers cannot promote, even if they use information
that was published and disseminated in established journals.105
The current legal landscape thus creates an unfortunate legal
no-man's-land. If a drug is not approved for any use at all, then
patients cannot use it to treat any ailment. Physicians may still
learn about these unapproved drugs from the limited information released about the outcomes of clinical trials. Once a drug
is approved for one use, however, the decision over off-label
uses lies within the ambit of physicians and hospitals, given
that the FDA cannot regulate medical practice.106

103. See Abelson & Pollack, supra note 92 (stating that Medicare's new policy of using recommendations from more voluntary organizations is partly in
response to concerns that "the agency has been too slow to recognize promising
new off-label treatments").
104. See, e.g., Society of Thoracic Surgeons, Welcome to the STS National
Database, http://www.sts.org/sections/stsnationaldatabase/ (last visited Oct.
21, 2009).
105. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 352 (2006) (regulating drug labeling); see also United States v. Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d 385,
392 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) ("It is well established that under the FDA's 'intended
use' regulations, the promotion of a drug for an off-label use by the manufacturer or its representative is prohibited regardless of what directions the
manufacturer or representative may give for that use."). See generally Johnson, supra note 54, at 81-83 (discussing some of the difficulties surrounding
the regulation of off-label drug use).
106. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Questions and Answers: Problem Reporting, http://www.fda.gov/Safety/ReportaProblem/QuestionsandAnswersProblem
Reporting/default.htm#problems (last visited Oct. 21, 2009) (noting "medical
practice" is not handled by the FDA).
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Off-label uses are a staple of cancer treatment. 107 Clinical
trials are extremely expensive and the FDA, under Congressional prodding, continues to add requirements that increase
the size of the patient cohort and the various subdivisions within it.10s Consequently, drug owners are reluctant to run clinical
trials for new indications-i.e. different types of tumors-while
physicians are reluctant to include patients in clinical trials.109
It becomes troublesome, and almost immoral, to subject very
sick individuals to clinical trials when the available evidence,
however sketchy, suggests that off-label use is likely more advantageous than standard treatments that have been tried and
have failed. Strong reasons back patients' reluctance to participate in clinical trials for off-label uses. First, patients are often
unwilling or unable to participate in trials because their odds of
getting a placebo during the clinical trial are quite high, often
between thirty-three and fifty percent. 110
Some estimates, however, indicate that over half of the prescription
medications provided to patients in the United States may be prescribed for a purpose, in a higher or lower dose, over a longer period of
time, or for a population (such as children) different from that for
which the drug has been approved.",

Second, manufactures have no financial incentive to undertake
trials. A standard drug or treatment has a limited patent life
that starts to run long before commercialization.112 Typically,
off-label uses proliferate through clinical trials only in rare circumstances-such as using Thalidomide for treating multiple
myeloma.113 The accumulation of information about off-label
uses takes additional time during which the patent clock keeps
running. Why should any patentee spend a fortune on clinical
107. See American Cancer Society, Off-Label Drug Use, http://www.cancer
.org/docroot/ETO/content/ETO 1_2xOff-Label_Drug_Use.asp (last visited Oct.
21, 2009) ("Off-label drug use is very common in cancer treatment.").
108. See Steve Usdin, Regulation: System Reset in 2008, BIOCENTURY, Jan.
21, 2008, at Al, A3-A4.
109. See id. (discussing how costs of the clinical trial scheme dissuade drug
development).
110. See Sharona Hoffman, The Use of Placebos in Clinical Trials:Responsible Research or UnethicalPractice?,33 CONN. L. REV. 449, 453 (2000).
111. Johnson, supra note 54, at 61 (citations omitted).
112. See Margaret Gilhooley, Drug Preemption and the Need to Reform the
FDA ConsultationProcess, 34 Am. J.L. & MED. 539, 552 (2008) ("Manufacturers are concerned about the limited patent life of their drugs and the need to
recoup the considerable cost of drug testing within a limited time frame.").
113. See Miranda Hitti, Thalidomide OK'd for Multiple Myeloma, WEBMD
HEALTH NEWS, May 26, 2006, http://www.webmd.com/mental-health/bulimia
-nervosa/news/20060526/thalidomide-okd-for-multiple-myeloma.
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trials for a drug that will go generic shortly after the clinical
trials are completed? Notwithstanding these difficulties, the
off-label uses of cancer drugs do not fall into a void, for there is
an exhaustive physician-driven literature that studies off-label
uses of particular drugs. This extensive literature is routinely
correlated by intermediate agencies that publish the information. The quality of these reviews is often less than ideal. A
study by Amy Abernethy and colleagues reviews six such compendia' 1 4 and notes serious gaps within the individual sources
and obvious room for improvement.1 15
Nonetheless, the shortfalls of one publication can be offset
by information obtainable from another source, since physicians can consult multiple references. The existence of gaps in
any one source does not necessarily lead to a parallel gap for
physicians. In addition, any new entry could, of course, improve
matters. After the publication of her study, Abernethy noted
that she did not oppose the decision of Medicare to reimburse
for off-label uses.116 Indeed in some cases the resources from
individual sites are impressive. The National Comprehensive
Cancer Network (NCCN) maintains a wide-ranging website
that offers extensive information about clinical practice guidelines for various cancers, including off-label uses. 117 Readers of
the NCCN website can find breast cancer guidelines that offer
insights on how to treat inflammatory breast cancer, which is
described as both "rare" and "aggressive."118 The use of the
words "rare" and "aggressive" indicates the importance of the
voluntary transmission of information. Aggressive cancers obviously need attention, but physicians who practice away from
major medical centers would necessarily struggle to gather information about these rare conditions. A national (or even global) network can better accumulate information on rare diseases
by publishing resources more rapidly than any federal agency.
114. See Abernethy et al., supra note 17, at 336.
115. Id. at 341-42.
116. Interestingly enough, despite her reservations, Dr. Abernethy noted
more recently that she did not oppose the new Medicare rules and cited new
entry into the market as her reason. See Abelson & Pollack, supra note 92 ("I
think the addition of the new compendia this year is an important increase in
the bandwidth." (quoting Dr. Abernethy)).
117. National Comprehensive Cancer Network, http://www.nccn.org (last
visited Oct. 21, 2009).
118. Press Release, Nat'l Comprehensive Cancer Network, NCCN Updates
Breast Cancer Guidelines (Jan. 22, 2008), available at http://www.nccn
.org/about/news/archived news.asp (follow "2008" hyperlink; then follow
"NCCN Updates Breast Cancer Guidelines" hyperlink).
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Does it matter that these extensive off-label uses do not
meet the FDA standards? It would if we were confident that
centralized government science outperforms voluntary organizations. But there is no evidence to support that conclusion.
Today's fractured system of regulation, part coercive and part
voluntary, arises from the fact that the FDA is not organized to
supply information on a continuous basis that keeps pace with
medical advances. Indeed nothing is more common, even for a
lawyer, than to hear physicians decry-but always off the
record-that FDA protocols, warnings and guidelines have
"nothing to do" with good medical practice.119 It is not a healthy
institutional situation for serious physicians to believe that the
FDA retards medical research by-to give the common number
I have heard-between three and five years.120
These cautionary signs are not always heeded. Even today
many medical experts champion full-scale clinical trials before
allowing drugs into general use.12 1 In doing so, however, they
misconceive the full nature of the problem. No one, of course,
wants to ban clinical trials. Nonetheless, palpable difficulties
arise in insisting that clinical trials should be strictly required
for all new drug uses. Trials often start at inconvenient times
for patients and patients lack options if trials are not open;
think back to Abigail Burroughs.122 "Reliable" information also
is, in Churchill's words, "too little, too late"123 for a cancer patient whose options have run dry. A quick and dirty treatment
often offers the best chance of survival.
In light of these considerations, our proper focus should be
on how much a patient has to forego for the "privilege" of par119. See Richard A. Epstein, The Case for Field Preemption of State Laws
in Drug Cases, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 463, 471 (2009) ("[T]he physician is in the
best position to determine if a treatment that is undesirable in some patients
is desirable in others . . . .").
120. See INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT'L ACADS., THE FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY 31-64 (Alina Bacin et al. eds., 2007) (describing the drug regulatory
process).
121. Thus I have been chastised as follows:
Does Epstein really not understand that properly designed and
conducted clinical trials are now universally accepted as the most reliable means of determining the effectiveness of a drug? . ..
Clinical trials . . . changed the basis for the use of drugs from

something akin to hearsay and witchcraft to something much closer
to science.

...

Relman, supra note 91, at 40.
122. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
123. EUGENE L. RASOR, WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, 1874-1965, at 261 (2000).
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ticipating in a clinical trial. Those costs necessarily decrease in
light of the alternative avenues used to obtain information
through the NCCN or similar organizations. In particular, it
would be instructive to learn which off-label uses were modified
or discontinued given their poor performance or, alternatively,
what are the performance levels of off-label uses that have
worked their way into common practice without going through
clinical trials. Another useful study would compare the reliability of information disseminated about a drug's on-label and offlabel use, to see if the frequency of adverse events from the offlabel use exceeds those from any permitted use. Off-label uses
are only for drugs that have already passed Phase I clinical trials, so that high toxicity is not a risk. Accumulated information
for off-label uses could prove more reliable than clinical trials. I
suspect that off-label uses are about as effective and safe as the
on-label uses. If that hypothesis should prove true, it undermines the argument that clinical trials are the gold standard
for measuring safety and effectiveness. If the hypothesis were
false, then there would be a slow and steady decline in off-label
uses, which does not appear to be occurring.
IV. CENTRALIZED VERSUS DECENTRALIZED
KNOWLEDGE
We are now in a position to step back from the particulars
of this dispute to examine the larger questions of the proper
theory of knowledge acquisition. The current FDA clinical trial
model reflects a belief in top-down knowledge, a theory which
prefers the centralized collection and evaluation of information
over decentralized methods. In effect, the FDA represents a
modern central-planning paradigm of the sort that F.A. Hayek
effectively criticized when socialism was at its height. 12 4 Single
sources of control lack the redundancy to correct error, stifle
the initiative that makes for advantages, and cannot coordinate
and assemble information that is held in discrete packets by
private individuals.
124. F. A. Hayek, Socialist Calculation:The Competitive 'Solution,' 7 EcoNOMICA 125, 125-27 (1940); F. A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35
AM. ECON. REV. 519, 524 (1945). For my approach to limited knowledge, see

generally Richard A. Epstein, Intuition, Custom, and Protocol: How to Make
Sound Decisions with Limited Knowledge, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 1 (2006)

(discussing how intuition, custom, and protocol create knowledge) and Richard
A. Epstein, The Uses and Limits of Local Knowledge: A Cautionary Note on
Hayek, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 205 (2005) (contrasting local and formal
knowledge).
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There is ample reason to think that Hayek's diagnosis accurately captures the lumbering condition of today's FDA. The
FDA's defenders note that even the recent statutory reforms 125
have left the FDA "chronically under-funded,"126 particularly
with respect to postmarketing surveillance. Officials worry that
the rise of new scientific fields and techniques will quickly supersede the abilities of the FDA. 127 Commonly, Congress responds to these rigidities with budgetary, rather than structural, solutions. Accordingly, the usual response attacks
"inadequate funding" by asking for more,128 only to find that
their prayers have been answered by the Obama administration.129 Increased funding to protect the food supply is welcome,
but funding to test for safer medical products could easily be
counterproductive by slowing down the introduction of new
products into the market. The fundamental question is never
asked: whether any centralized agency can be nimble enough to
process information. On this score the dismal history of central
planning in every other sector of the economy suggests that serious improvements cannot be reached by putting the FDA on
steroids. Just think of the information imbalances that remain
no matter what the size of the FDA. The applications for new
drug approval are all prepared by scientists that have dozens of
years of experience dealing with a single compound for a single
treatment. To be sure, cancer becomes a broad umbrella under
which many different subspecialties develop. The FDA does not
have the institutional capability to develop a parallel expertise
on the opposite side of the line. Instead it has to work through
all-purpose cancer generalists who cannot match the detailed
knowledge that the applicant can muster in support of its ap-

125. See Prescription Drug User Fee Amendments of 2007, Pub. L. No. 11085, 121 Stat. 823, 825-42 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 379g-379j
(West Supp. 2009)).
126. David A. Kessler & David C. Viadeck, A Critical Examination of the
FDA's Efforts to Preempt Failure-to-Warn Claims, 96 GEO. L.J. 461, 472
(2008); see also INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT'L ACADS., supra note 120, at 193
("There is little dispute that the FDA in general is ... severely underfunded.").
127. See SUBcOMM. ON ScI. & TECH., FDA Sci. BD., FDA SCIENCE AND MISSION AT RISK 22 (2007).
128. Id. at 6.
129. Matthew Borghese, Obama's Budget Expands FDA's Food, Medicine
Safety Funding, May 12, 2009, ALL HEADLINE NEWS, http://www.all
headlinenews.com/articles/7015110502 ("Obama's budget will give an additional 19 percent in funding to the FDA's two major projects; protecting America's food supply and ensuring safer medical products.").
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plication. 130 The knowledge differential leads to excessive caution, which translates into more hesitation, more cost, and
more delay. No funding increase can alter this knowledge imbalance. The dangers of permititis rest on the simple observation that the current regulatory structure gives too much power
to too few individuals. Money alone cannot change this.
In some sense the situation is even worse. The FDA chokehold position in all likelihood slows down the dissemination of
information about various forms of drug treatment. Recently
the FDA floated an idea to allow drug companies to disseminate information about off-label uses that have appeared in
peer-reviewed journals,131 which means virtually all journals.
The proposal has predictably been met with resistance from the
adherents of the centralized model who think that the FDA
should keep as much control over drug information as possible.132 This position seems clearly to be wrong, perhaps even
perverse. First, the mere fact that reputable journals publish
clinical studies on off-label uses shows that an extensive gray
market has developed, which is a sign of a dysfunctional regulatory system. Second, the distribution of peer-reviewed studies
responds to the reservations about the FDA system of clinical
trials. That system runs its clinical trials on limited populations for limited periods of time. The postrelease studies help
overcome both inherent limitations because, almost by definition, they involve longer time periods with larger numbers of
patients.133
Encouraging circulation of these articles has the added
benefit of increasing the availability of independent knowledge
about drugs. Ironically, the FDA's proposal to allow only the
130. Cf. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., How Drugs are Developed and Approved, http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsare
DevelopedandApproved/default.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2009) (noting that a
team of "physicians, statisticians, chemists, pharmacologists, and other scientists" reviews any new drug application submitted for FDA approval).
131. News Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Proposes Guidance for
Dissemination of Information on Unapproved Uses of Medical Products (Feb.
15, 2008), available at http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/Press
Announcements/2008/ucm116859.htm (recommending that distribution be limited to peer-reviewed journals with editorial boards that have conflict of interest policies); see Anna Wilde Mathews & Avery Johnson, Boost for Off-Label
Drug Use: FDA Would Let Firms Keep Doctors Informed on Unapproved Methods, WALL. ST. J., Feb. 16, 2008, at A3 (reporting on the FDA proposal).
132. See Mathews & Johnson, supra note 131.
133. See ABELOFF'S CLINICAL ONCOLOGY, supra note 26, at 327-35 (describing several opportunities for physicians and patients to participate in
clinical trials and the review process for clinical trials).
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drug manufacturers to distribute the information leads to biased information, as companies can choose to selectively release information. 134 Instead, the FDA should post all the information about off-label uses on its websites, thereby
offsetting any perceived weaknesses in the alternative sources
of information, e.g., the various compendia about off-label
uses. 135 The objective must be the best dissemination of information to help save lives. The FDA cannot guard against the
possibility that posting this information will be interpreted as
an impermissible implied promotion of an off-label use; it
should not try to maintain that empty fagade.
We can take the argument one step further. A better option
would be to allow companies to promote drugs for established
off-label uses, that is, those covered by Medicare or private insurance. This approach would allow companies to effectively
market these drugs. For example, the FDA recently allowed
Genentech to gain accelerated market approval of Avastin (bevacizumab) for breast cancer, which immediately resulted in an
eight-percent increase in the market value of its shares.1 36 In
turn, this accelerated market approval allows Genentech to
produce for the new uses, which leads to more rapid informa134. See Jeanne Lenzer, Drug Secrets: What the FDA Isn't Telling, SLATE,
Sept. 25, 2005, http://www.slate.com/id/2126918/ (noting that even if a drug is
already on the market for different uses, trade secret concerns may lead drug
companies to not divulge results from failed clinical trials that have adverse
events).
135. In general, I support the publication of trade secret information
needed to evaluate serious health risks. That also seems to be the general
principle in Corn ProductsRefining Co. v. Eddy, which stated:
[I]t is too plain for argument that a manufacturer or vendor has no
constitutional right to sell goods without giving to the purchaser fair
information of what it is that is being sold. The right of a manufacturer to maintain secrecy as to his compounds and processes must be
held subject to the right of the State, in the exercise of its police power and in promotion of fair dealing, to require that the nature of the
product be fairly set forth.
249 U.S. 427, 431-32 (1919). This rationale clearly applies to drugs that might
have harmful effects; however, similar disclosures of trade secrets should not
be applied when these risks of adulteration, misbranding, or danger to health
are not present. See Richard A. Epstein, The Constitutional Protection of
Trade Secrets Under the Takings Clause, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 57, 61-73 (2004)
(discussing which risks should be disclosed and why that raises hard questions
of implementation).
136. See Andrew Pollack, Wider Use of Avastin Is Approved, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 23, 2008, at C1 (discussing the increase in share values after Avastin's
approval); see also Marilyn Chase & Anna Wilde Mathews, Genentech Clears
Hurdle on Cancer Drug Avastin, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23-24, 2008, at A3 (reporting on Avastin's approval).
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tion dissemination than the NCCN can supply. Genentech undoubtedly gained hundreds of millions of dollars from the FDA
decision, but the increase in the market value of the firm understates the social gain from this FDA decision. The increase
in share value does not include the anticipated consumer surplus (subjective value less market price) to users. These numbers are likely to be very large indeed, given the intrinsic value
of life and the restricted wealth of many patients-which
means that no pricing system, however clever, can capture the
entire relevant surplus. There are some fortunate consequences
to the imperfect correlation between utility and wealth. 137 For
example, AIDS drugs can produce immense benefits to patients
far beyond their ability to pay. 138 So long as the companies can
cover their expenses, they will continue to produce these drugs,
even if they cannot capture the full amount of the patient surplus in fees.
V. THE FDA DECISIONS ON CANCER DRUGS
The relative theoretical competence of decentralized and
centralized systems is borne out by a closer examination of the
FDA's decision-making processes. Generally, the power to issue
permits gives administrative officials enormous control. In any
permit system the individual applicant has the burden to show
that the product in question meets all government safety standards. 139 Conversely, the standard judicial rule is that injunctions against actions that might harm other persons should be
issued only after a showing of an imminent risk of a serious
harm. 140 Thus the permit system gives public officials far
greater power than the standard form of injunctive relief.
The power given to the FDA exceeds its ability to discharge
its obligations, as all agree that the FDA lacks the resources or
expertise needed to evaluate cutting-edge scientific technolo137. See Tomas J. Philipson & Anupam B. Jena, Who Benefits from New
Medical Technologies? Estimates of Consumer and Producer Surpluses for
HIVIAIDS Drugs, 9 F. FOR HEALTH ECON. & POL'Y, issue 2, art. 3, at 16
(2006), http://www.bepress.com/fhep/biomedicalresearch/3/ (noting that even
with unregulated prices, drug innovators could only capture about five percent
of the social surplus through innovation).
138. See id. at 1 (noting that, in the aggregate, there is a $1.33 trillion dollar consumer surplus in the total lifetime value of HIV/AIDS drugs).
139. Cf. Richard A. Epstein, The Permit Power Meets the Constitution, 81
IOWA L. REV. 407, 414-19 (1995) (discussing how permit systems currently
operate).
140. See id. at 414.

36

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[94:1

gies. 141 The FDA's difficulties do not stop with this endemic
problem. Two other issues, each illustrated by recent developments in the field, are also noteworthy. These involve, first, the
articulation of standards for intelligent judgment, and, second,
the risk of influence from powerful political or economic interests.
A. STANDARDS OF JUDGMENT

Drug bans must necessarily draw sharp lines between
products allowed into the market and those which are kept off.
Any estimation of safety and effectiveness necessarily lies on a
two-dimensional continuum, which makes it nigh impossible to
impose defensible rulings on when the ban is desirable and
when it is not. Any revision of an initial decision is necessarily
subject to similar difficulties. Voluntary organizations, which
advise but do not ban, do not face this problem. They report all
the information, and members choose which course of treatment to follow based on the report and patient preference. 142
Clearly other factors are likely to be involved, but those complexities do not alter this basic conclusion.
A full evaluation of a particular drug leads some physicianpatient pairs to use drugs in ways that other physician-patient
pairs will not. The variation in uses allows scientists to update
their assessment of the overall utility of a particular product.
Thereafter, everyone can make timely revisions of their initial
decisions. Use will decline when the early findings are bad and
will increase when they are good. Additionally, as more data
arrives, the protocols and the counterindications will become
clearer, allowing for a greater convergence in judgment over
time. These decentralized adjustments are less vulnerable to
the peculiar preferences (or prejudices) of a single FDA committee, whose members, after all, are chosen by the FDA itself.14 3
141. See SUBCOMM. ON Scl. & TECH., FDA Scl. BD., FDA SCIENCE AND
MISSION AT RISK: ESTIMATED RESOURCES REQUIRED FOR IMPLEMENTATION 8-

9 (2008), available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/Pressj110/022508
.ScienceBoardReport.EstimatedResources.pdf (noting that the "FDA lacks information technology (IT) capability and capacity to support monitoring of
drug and food safety and is particularly challenged in the regulation of products based upon new science").
142. See, e.g., Project Inform: Mission Statement, http://www.projectinform
.org/about/mission.shtml (last visited Oct. 21, 2009) ("Project Inform ... supports individuals to make informed choices about their HIV health. . . .").
143. See Steve Usdin, FDA Reviewing Intellectual Bias, BIOCENTURY, Apr.
20, 2009, at All.
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If the bottleneck created by the FDA's permit power is removed, the product use will increase, revenues will move upward, and more research will take place.
A further danger of centralized systems is that government
officials tend to overrely on objective measures, most notably
the extension of life, to decide which products to allow into the
marketplace. They cannot enter into complex and subtle tradeoffs. Decisions that deal with quality of life are often put on
the back burner. The FDA also ignores the variations of patient
responses by basing its decision on average responses. 144 This
approach tends to deny licensing approvals to products that
serve a fraction of the overall population, even if it is of no benefit to the rest. That appears to be the motivation for the FDA's
controversial decision to limit the use of Iressa to persons already on the drug. 145
The severity of these regulatory conflicts is revealed by the
recent FDA decision to grant, over much opposition, Genentech
an accelerated approval to promote and sell Avastin, its drug
for breast cancer patients. 146 The FDA advisory committee
voted five to four against the use of the drug, 147 and if that recommendation had been followed, the 38,000 or so women eligible for treatment would have been denied all (on-label) use,
with an obvious hit on Genentech's share price. 148 As shown, a
single vote looms all too large in the regulatory system that
faces sharp discontinuities in outcome no matter where or how
it sets its decision point. The opposite is true in a decentralized
system, where both sides register their best judgment and allow downstream users to decide whether or not to use the
144. See EPSTEIN, supra note 19, at 137 ("The FDA deals only in averages,
and the averages don't predict the response of any one individual to either
drug." (quoting Steven Walker, Letter to the Editor, Iressa: The Reality us. the
FDA's Version, WALL ST. J., July 26, 2005, at A25)).
145. See id. at 135-38.
146. See Victoria Colliver, New Option for Breast Cancer Treatment, S.F.
CHRON., Feb. 23, 2008, at Al (noting that approval was granted in the absence
of any other treatment for metastatic breast cancer).
147. See FDA Panel Nixes Avastin for Breast Cancer, http://www
.pharmalot.com/2007/12/fda-panel-nixes-avastin-for-breast-cancer(Dec.5, 2007,
16:36 EST) (noting that FDA medical reviewers found that the slower rate of
tumor progression did not offset the increase in side effects).
148. See Heather Tomlinson, The FDA: Feared Throughout the Pharmaceutical Industry, INDEPENDENT, Aug. 12, 2001, http://www.independent.co
.uk/news/business/news/the-fda-feared-throughout-the-pharmaceutical-industry665420.html (discussing the negative impact of an FDA rejection on a drug
company's share prices).
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treatment. In any decentralized setting, we can predict that a
five-to-four vote against the use by a learned committee would
on average result in fewer users than a five-to-four vote in favor. The numerical count will provide some information wholly
apart from the knowledge of which panel members took which
position. But that difference is likely to be small because there
is no discontinuity at the fifty percent point.
The problem is still more worrisome, for on the merits no
one is really sure who is right. Evidence suggests that using
Avastin in conjunction with Taxol, a well-established drug, delayed tumor progression for about 5.5 months longer than the
use of Taxol alone-a clear plus. 149 By the same token, Avastin
did not prolong life by any significant measure and had a higher rate of adverse side effects than when Taxol was used
alone. 15 0 The FDA's inclination to question the use of Avastin is
understandable because the objective measures do not stack up
well in comparison trials. But so what? One reason why the
principles of full disclosure and informed consent have gained
such traction is that they respect subjective preferences on
questions concerning the quality of life. 15 1 Within a decentralized system, the downward push of information allows potential users to absorb it seamlessly. If physicians are "split" over
the use of a drug such as Avastin, then patients' decisions will
likely follow that division. An administrative decision that converts a five-to-four vote against a drug into a legal regime that
prohibits its use is illogical in close cases. And, again, note this
abiding asymmetry: a vote of five to four in favor does not require all to use the drug, but allows all patients to choose to use
it. The distribution and interpretation of information strongly
favor a decentralized system that relies on persuasion.
B. EXTERNAL INFLUENCES
The process to decide whether the FDA should approve a
drug does not take place in hermetic environment in which the
science, and only the science, governs the ultimate outcome. By
necessity there are always political overtones that arise because of the identity of the permit applicant and its potential
customers and competitors, all of whom have some access to the
149. See Pollack, supra note 136 (reporting that women went a median of
11.3 months before their cancer worsened or they died when they used Avastin
in combination with Taxol, compared with 5.8 months if they just took Taxol).
150. See id.
151. See Schuck, supra note 29, at 924-25.
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FDA and to the congressional committees that oversee its actions. Competitors, for example, stand to lose market share if a
rival product is licensed for sale. The FDA is subject to constant
political pressure, such as the nonstop, bipartisan attacks of influential figures Senator Charles Grassley and Representative
John Dingell, on the ineffective protection that the FDA renders to consumers. 152 Other political actors are reluctant to attack Senator Grassley, whose support might be needed on other
health care issues such as Medicare reform. 153
On the economic side the stakes are also enormous. If a
second drug in a given class enters the market then it undercuts the monopoly obtained by the first to enter. Even in a duopoly situation, unit prices often fall by thirty percent or more in
markets where sales could amount of tens, even hundreds, of
millions of dollars per year.154 Therefore, competitors often take
steps to torpedo their rivals' FDA applications. One recent example involves the FDA decision to delay approval, for more
tests of course, of the cancer vaccine Provenge, which had
shown promising results on certain classes of prostate cancers. 155 The FDA decision was roundly attacked in thousands of
letters by angry persons who thought that this vaccine held out
some hope for patients. 15 6 The account of the matter published
in Nature Biotechnology stated that approval delays for Provenge went against the advice of an advisory committee. 15 7 The
152. See, e.g., Alicia Mundy, Dingell, Grassley Call for Overhaul of Agency
'Culture,' WALL ST. J., July 30, 2008, at A4 (reporting that reforms proposed
by Senator Grassley and Representative Dingell, aimed at increasing the
FDA's effectiveness, would give the FDA the power to levy fines, expanded
power to order drug recalls, and the authority to impose additional limitations
on drug advertisements); see also Press Release, Charles E. Grassley, Ranking
Member, U.S. Senate Comm. on Fin., Grassley Asks for an Accounting of Contacts Between FDA and Device Maker (Mar. 6, 2009), available at http://
finance.senate.gov/press/Gpress/2009/prg030609d.pdf (noting what Grassley
deems "a 'too cozy relationship' between the FDA and industry").
153. See Usdin, supra note 108, at A2.
154. Luis M. B. CABRAL, INTRODUCTION To INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 112
(2000) (noting that duopoly prices are lower than monopoly prices).
155. See Editorial, The Regulator Disapproves, NATURE BIOTECH., Jan.
2008, at 1, 1 (discussing the FDA's decision to delay approval of the cancer
vaccine Provenge, calling it a "knee-jerk defensive response to accusations of
process impropriety").
156. See id.
157. See id. Advisory committees are composed of experts in a given field to
advise the FDA on whether and how to approve certain types of drugs. See
U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Advisory Committees, http://www.fda.gov/
AdvisoryCommittees/default.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2009) (discussing the
composition of FDA advisory committees).
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report further stated that Provenge's denial was triggered by a
critical letter from Howard Scher, a doctor in the Memorial
Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center, who had an undisclosed financial and fiduciary interest in a rival drug Asentar.158
Conflict of interest regulations require routine disclosure of
these connections, thereby allowing public authorities to discount these claims, if they so choose. Nonetheless questions of
undue influence still remain. Unfortunately, permititis makes
the entire information system more vulnerable to subversion
than the NCCN and similar voluntary organizations, where a
few powerful individuals or institutions are not in a position to
subvert new or experimental drugs. Improper evidence could, of
course, mislead NCCN members. Any potential harm is cabined
because voluntary organizations cannot issue bans and other
information can surface to counteract previously misleading
facts. Yet this key fact remains: the redundancy of a decentralized information system offsets its failings and makes it resistant to political maneuvers that are inherent when government
officials exercise the permit power.
CONCLUSION
This article is a conscious outlier from other treatments on
the vexed topic of FDA power. In it, I do not ask how the FDA
should exercise its permit powers; instead I focus on the prior
question of whether the FDA should have those powers at all.
My analysis is not meant to be ad hoc or personal. Rather, it
starts from a general political theory which maintains a strong
presumption against the use of the permit power to regulate
autonomous individuals. It then examines FDA activities to
identify some sufficient reason to overcome that presumption.
The search is futile. The standard justification for the use of
state power, namely the protection against the risk of force or
fraud, plays little if any role.
Nor does it appear that the FDA can engage in some wellcalibrated campaign of consumer protection against the hasty
and unwise choices that people undoubtedly make in their own
lives. To be sure, it would be foolish to dismiss this risk on the
ground that all individuals are imbued with a natural talent to
make only rational choices. They aren't. But it takes more than
this showing to justify the FDA's expansive permit power.
First, the mode of distribution of drugs matters. Greater con158.

See The RegulatorDisapproves,supra note 155, at 1.
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cern exists about impulsive, habitual, or otherwise foolish behavior when individuals have direct access to certain drugs.
Here we should be highly cautious about bans, even while entertaining the possibility. Cancer drugs are always distributed
through professional intermediaries with ready access to scientific and technical information. These intermediate organizations play an extensive role right now, even as the FDA exercises its strong gatekeeper function. Allowing one on-label use
does not decide whether a drug should be used, or whether that
use should be alone or in conjunction with other drugs. It does
not decide whether that drug should be used as a first-line or
second-line treatment. Nor does it even hint at the structure of
the gray market culture of off-label uses.
The key conclusion is that voluntary current mechanisms
for both on-label and off-label uses are far more likely to work
across the board. In this arena, two systems of control are not
better than one. Rather, public investments in the FDA's permit power will likely yield a negative return. Decentralized bodies are more likely to make sounder decisions. As information
is collated and presented, slow shifts in uses and behaviors under a legal regime that facilitates continuous updating and experimentation should be expected. Even if the FDA obtains additional resources, it could not discharge its chosen mission. At
any resource level, the FDA is a second-best relative to the current private systems and these systems could be improved further if drug companies were allowed to participate in the dissemination of information generated by independent sources.
Right now, the prospects for incremental FDA reforms are unlikely. No matter how Congress tinkers with the present
framework, the FDA would still use control over the processes
that systematically underestimate the risks of delay, would ignore variation across individual cases, and would be vulnerable
to enormous political and economic pressures. The FDA's permit power is an open wound in the body politic. Permititis cannot be controlled; it should be eliminated.

